University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Law Publications

Faculty of Law

2017

Legal Services Regulation in Canada: Plus Ça Change?
Noel Semple
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Semple, Noel. (2017). Legal Services Regulation in Canada: Plus Ça Change?. International Perspectives
on the Regulation of Lawyers and Legal Services.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/59

This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at
UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Legal Services Regulation in Canada: Plus ça change?
By Noel Semple1

1. Introduction
Today’s legal services regulatory regimes are diverse and idiosyncratic, as this volume
clearly demonstrates. However, a clear pattern emerges when the common law world is surveyed
with a wide-angle comparative lens. In common law Northern Europe and in Australasia, a wave of
reform has been transforming legal services regulation since roughly 1980. Old structures and
approaches, based on the principles of professionalism and lawyer independence, are being replaced
in these jurisdictions by new ones that prioritize competition and consumer interests.2 In the United
States this has conspicuously not happened, leaving intact a regulatory approach whose broad
outlines have changed little in the past 100 years.3
Thus, I have argued that the legal services regulatory regimes of the common law world
today are bifurcated into (i) a competitive-consumerist paradigm apparent in the UK, in Australia,
and in their smaller neighbours, and (ii) a professionalist-independent mode which survives in the
United States and a few other places.4 This dichotomy, I believe, maps a foundational difference in
regulatory methodologies.5 Contrasting approaches to alternative business structures, to non-lawyer
practice, to self-regulation, and to entity regulation in these two clusters of anglophone countries
make the dichotomy apparent.6
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Identifying consumer protection and/or competition promotion as key drivers of legal services regulatory reform,
see e.g. Julian Webb, "The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice - and Some
Lessons for New Zealand" (2008) 16 Waikato L. Rev. 21; Judith L. Maute, "Global continental shifts to a new
governance paradigm in lawyer regulation and consumer protection : riding the wave" in Reid Mortensen, Francesca
Bartlett & Kieran Tranter eds., Alternative perspectives on lawyers and legal ethics: reimagining the profession
(New York: Routledge, 2010); Frank Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2013); Nuno Garoupa, "Globalization and deregulation of legal services" (2014) 38 International Review of Law
and Economics 77 at 81.
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Noel Semple, Russell Pearce and Renee Newman Knake, "A Taxonomy of Lawyer Regulation: How Contrasting
Theories of Regulation Explain the Divergent Regulatory Regimes in Australia, England and Wales, and North
America" (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 258.
4
Noel Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads: Justitia's Legions (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2015).
5
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4, Chapters 3 and 4.
6
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4, Chapter 3. Related analysis of the divergence
in the common law world, see also Deborah L. Rhode and Alice Woolley, "Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada" (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2761 and Ted
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Figure 1: Two Paradigms of Legal Services Regulation7
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Where does Canada fit into this picture? With a view to locating my home and native land
on the spectrum between the competitive-consumerist and professionalist-independent traditions,
this Chapter reviews key characteristics and important recent developments in Canadian legal
services regulation. After providing an overview of the Canadian legal profession, the Chapter
proceeds in four sections: (i) Governance and the Role of the State; (ii) Professional Organization
and Occupational Unity; (iii) Firm Insulation and Alternative Business Structures, and (iv)
Regulatory Focus.
I conclude that, in Canada’s common law provinces, legal services regulation remains
firmly in the professionalist-independent tradition. The approach is much more similar to American
legal services regulation than it is to UK or Australasian legal services regulation. However, civilian
and predominantly francophone Quebec is a “distinct society” within Canada in its legal services
regulation as in other things. Policy choices including a more prominent role for the state, a
bifurcation of the legal profession, and a greater tolerance of non-lawyer involvement in law firms
place Quebec somewhat apart from the common law provinces, and closer to the competitiveconsumerist mode.
Schneyer, "Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in
Regulating Law Practice" (2009) 2009 J. Prof. Law. 13.
7
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To say that the basic story is one of continuity is not to say that Canada’s legal services
regulators are resting on their haunches. Along with ongoing fine-tuning, they are discussing
competitive-consumerist reforms such as liberalizing business structure rules, encouraging
competition between multiple legal professions, and regulating law firms as opposed to only
practitioners. However, in Canada these discussions occur almost exclusively among lawyers in the
legal services regulatory and academic communities. They have not sparked much interest among
the consumer groups, competition authorities, and elected leaders whose counterparts took them up
in places like England & Wales and Australia. For this reason, the author predicts that any steps
towards competitive-consumerist legal services regulatory reform in Canada will be tentative
compromises, rather than the big bangs that have transformed systems elsewhere in the common
law world.

a) Canada’s Lawyers and Firms
The words “lawyer” and the French equivalent “avocat” are used to describe the main body
of legal professionals throughout the country.8 Canadian lawyers are authorized to provide all legal
services, and most such services are reserved for them exclusively.9 There were 117,132 Canadian
lawyers in 2013:10 one for every 300 Canadians. Roughly one quarter of Canada’s private practice
lawyers in are sole practitioners.11 Approximately 20% of private practitioner lawyers work in
firms with more than 50 lawyers,12 with the remainder in small and mid-sized firms.13 Not included
in these figures are the growing numbers of lawyers employed within corporations and government.
In the corporate client hemisphere, the size of Canadian law firms (like American law firms) tends

8

Although informal reference is sometimes made to “barristers” and “solicitors” there is no regulatory or legal
distinction between them. (Adam M. Dodek et al., Canadian legal practice : a guide for the 21st century
(Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2009)). Regulation does however distinguish a few small legal paraprofessions, including Ontario’s licensed paralegals and Quebec’s notaries. (Section 2, infra.)
9
See section 3, infra.
10
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Membership (2013 Statistical Report) (Ottawa: FLSC, 2013) online:
FLSC <http://docs.flsc.ca/STATS2013ReportFINAL.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016)
11
Solos make up 34% of all lawyers in Ontario, 13% of all Quebec lawyers, and 22.65% of all BC lawyers. Sources:
Law Society of Upper Canada, "2015 Annual Report Data," <http://www.annualreport.lsuc.on.ca/2015/en/annualreport-data.html#LawFirmsBySize> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Barreau du Quebec, Barreau-Mètre 2015: La
Profession En Chiffres (Quebec: Barreau du Quebec, 2015) online: Barreau du Quebec
<http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/barreau-metre-2015.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Law Society of
British Columbia, "Quick Facts: About the Profession,"
<https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=2189&t=About-the-Profession> (last accessed: 3 June 2016). These
three provinces collectively contain 75% of Canada’s population.
12
The proportions that work in these firms are as follows: Quebec -- 30.1%; BC -- 8.16%; Ontario -- 19%. Sources
ibid.
13
See also Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "Membership (2013 Statistical Report)," supra note 10.

4
to be proportionate to the size of the clients.14 Personal clients are served almost exclusively by
small and mid-sized firms.15

2. Governance and the Role of the State
Lawyers have traditionally enjoyed a significant degree of control over their own regulation,
as noted by the Introduction to this volume. According to the professionalist-independent public
interest theory, direct regulation by government would allow the state to coerce lawyers using the
threat of discipline. Thus, self-regulation is said to foster loyal lawyer service to clients, especially
those clients who confront the state.16 According to Emile Durkheim and his followers, independent
self-regulating professions also offer advantages related to efficiency and social cohesion.17 These
ideas still have great force in the United States, (although some consider the prominent role of the
courts in that country a departure from true self-regulation).18
In countries like Australia and England & Wales, the neoliberal state has taken an
increasingly prominent role in regulating legal services.19 Lawyer self-regulation is under serious
threat or has been essentially abandoned in much of the common law world.20 It is typically
14

For detailed empirical study of Canadian corporate law firms, see the recent work of Ronit Dinovitzer, Hugh
Gunz, and Sally Gunz: http://individual.utoronto.ca/dinovitzer/#filter=.post3 and Ronit Dinovitzer, Hugh Gunz and
Sally Gunz, "The Changing Landscape Of Corporate Legal Practices: An Empirical Study Of Lawyers In Large
Corporate Law Firms" (2015) 93 Canadian Bar Review .
15
This is especially true regarding contested “personal plight” matters: Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, reputations, and
rewards : contingency fee legal practice in the United States (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004);
Noel Semple, "Personal Plight Legal Services and Tomorrow's Lawyers" (2014) 2014 Journal of the Legal
Profession 25, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2436438> (last accessed: 3 June 2016) at 43. In uncontested “personal
business” matters a few larger firms are now competing, such as Anderson Sinclair LLP and Axess Law (which
operates in Walmarts).
16
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 220-222. There is also a broader claim in
the literature to the effect that the legal profession fosters good government and/or liberal democracy, if and only if
the profession is truly independent from the state. (Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note
4 at 220-222; Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, "Politics Matter" in Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik
eds., Lawyers and the rise of western political liberalism : Europe and North America from the eighteenth to
twentieth centuries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America
(New York: Adlard and Saunders, [1831] 1862)at 356; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, [1922] 1978).
17
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at Chapter 7.
18
Maute, "Global continental shifts to a new governance paradigm in lawyer regulation and consumer protection :
riding the wave," supra note 2; Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, "Trends And Challenges In Lawyer
Regulation: The Impact Of Globalization And Technology" (2012) 80 Fordham Law Review 2661; Dana Ann
Remus, "Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships" (2011) 30 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 123.
19
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 57-60; Terry, Mark and Gordon, "Trends
And Challenges In Lawyer Regulation: The Impact Of Globalization And Technology," supra note 18 at 2673;
Duncan Webb, "Are Lawyers Regulatable?" (2008) 5 Alberta Law Review 233 at 243.
20
Gordon Turriff, "The Consumption of Lawyer Independence" (2010) 17 International Journal of the Legal
Profession 283.
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replaced by “co-regulation” whereby the self-regulatory bodies are effectively subordinate to
executive and/or legislative arms of the state.21
In common law Canada, however, lawyer self-regulation is alive and well.22 There is a law
society in each of Canada’s 10 provinces and 3 territories. These bodies, which are led by and
chosen by lawyers, exercise remarkably complete control over legal services regulation in their
respective provinces and territories.23 They establish licensing requirements, promulgate codes of
conduct, and exercise discipline. Most regulatory investigations still result from client complaints,
despite a trend towards increasing regulatory proactivity.24 The law societies provide compensation
for losses resulting from lawyer wrongdoing or error in some cases.25 However, the professional
liability insurance which they require lawyers to carry plays a more important role in this regard.26
The law societies are established by provincial legislation.27 However these empowering
statutes give the societies ample power and discretion, and the have typically been amended in ways
proposed by the law societies themselves. Judges, legislators, and government officials, who have
acquired influence to varying degrees in other parts of the world, have quite minor roles in Canadian
legal services regulation.28
The “rule of law” is a core value system for Canadian lawyers. The very first line in the
national Model Code of Conduct states that the rule of law is a “hallmark of civilized society” that
privileges lawyers and imposes commensurate responsibilities on them.29 The phrase is given

21

Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 57-60.
Alice Woolley, Understanding lawyers' ethics in Canada (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2011) at 4.
23
Noel Semple, "Male, Pale, and Stale? Diversity in Lawyers' Regulatory Leadership (working paper),"
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623743.> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
24
See section 4(b), infra.
25
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 42-3.
26
Herbert M. Kritzer, "Lawyers’ Professional Liability: Comparative Perspectives (Manuscript on file with author)"
(2016) .
27
E.g. Law Society Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8; Law Society Act, 1999 (Newfoundland & Labrador),
SNL1999, c. L-9.1
28
On the judicial role, see Amy Salyzyn, "The Judicial Regulation of Lawyers in Canada" (2014) 37 Dalhousie Law
Journal 481. Regarding the institutional division of authority over legal services regulation in Canada, see Richard
Devlin and Ora Morison, "Access To Justice And The Ethics And Politics Of Alternative Business Structures"
(2014) 91 Canadian Bar Review 483 at 538.
29
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "Model Code of Professional Conduct," <http://flsc.ca/nationalinitiatives/model-code-of-professional-conduct/> (last accessed: 3 June 2016), Preface. See also Semple, Legal
Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 194-5 and s. 4.2(1) of the Law Society Act (Ontario), R.S.O.
1990, c. L.8: “The Society has a duty to maintain and advance the cause of justice and the rule of law.”
22
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similar emphasis by the Canadian Bar Association,30 and in the oath sworn by new lawyers in
Ontario.31 Many Canadian lawyers see upholding the rule of law as a reason to maintain selfregulation, insofar as this governance model lets them resist state coercion and hold government
officials to account.32 From another (although not necessarily irreconcilable) point of view, Adam
Dodek identifies the rule of law as the “beginning of lawyers’ collective exercise of power” in this
country.33 Dodek sees self-regulation is a central component of Canadian lawyers’ power.34
If Canadian governments were to challenge lawyers’ self-regulation, there is a good chance
that courts would come to the system’s defence. “Independence of the bar” is a principle that the
Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly endorsed and one which may have quasi-constitutional
status.35 Most recently, the Supreme Court struck down federal anti-money-laundering legislation
that would have required lawyers to report client transactions, citing independence of the bar and the
fact that law societies already had comparable rules with the same goals.36 Whether or not this
judicially-protected independence could be reconciled with a legislative push for co-regulation or
direct state regulation would remain to be seen.37

a) Recent Canadian Trends in Governance
In competitive-consumerist jurisdictions such as England & Wales and Australia, traditional
legal self-regulation was curtailed or abolished under pressure from governments, competition
authorities, and consumer groups.38 In Canada, there are few signs of any such pressure. The

30

“We are … the guardian of the rule of law in Canada.” (Canadian Bar Association, "Mission and Vision,"
<http://www.cba.org/Who-We-Are/About-us/Mission-and-Vision> (last accessed: 3 June 2016)).
31
“I shall champion the rule of law.” (Law Society of Upper Canada, "Barristers' Oath,"
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9720> (last accessed: 3 June 2016)).
32
E.g. F.C. DeCoste, "Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Professional Responsibility" (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 109;
Task Force on the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Bar, In the public interest : the report and research
papers of the Law Society of Upper Canada's Task Force on the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Bar
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007); Turriff, "The Consumption of Lawyer Independence," supra note 20.
33
Adam Dodek, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Lawyers and Power in Canadian Society" in David L. Blaikie,
Thomas Cromwell & Darrel Pink eds., Why Good Lawyers Matter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2012).
34
Ibid.
35
Canada (AG) v Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 307 at 335-36; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v
Canada (Attorney General); R v Fink, 2002 SCC 61 at 68, [2002] 3 SCR 209; John Pearson, "Canada’s Legal
Profession: Self-regulating in the Public Interest?" (2015) 92 Canadian Bar Review 555 at 565.
36
"Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] 1 SCR 401," <https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14639/index.do> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
37
Alice Woolley, "Rhetoric And Realities: What Independence Of The Bar Requires Of Lawyer Regulation" (2012)
45 University of British Columbia Law Review 145. Arguing that independence does not necessarily require selfregulation, see Pearson, "Canada’s Legal Profession: Self-regulating in the Public Interest?," supra note 35.
38
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4.

7
Competition Bureau brought a case against Toronto real estate agents in 2012,39 and fired a shot
across the self-regulating professions’ collective bow in 2007,40 and but has made no subsequent
moves against lawyers. Criticism of the law societies in the press to date has not generally called
for government intervention, but rather for changes to be led by the societies themselves.41
One notable governance trend is the increasing influence of the Federation of Law Societies
of Canada (FLSC) over the law societies.42 A major accomplishment was the harmonization of
most terms in most provinces’ codes with a national Model Code of Professional Conduct.43
Discipline procedures and licensing processes are also increasingly consistent with FLSC national
standards.44 However, the empowerment of the FLSC cannot be considered a step away from selfregulation. The FLSC’s governing council is entirely nominated by the law societies themselves,
and it has no legal authority to impose anything on them.45
While Canada’s governments have generally declined to challenge the Law Societies’
hegemony, one small but interesting exception recently arose in Ontario. Facing a dire access to
justice problem in the family courts,46 Ontario’s Ministry of the Attorney General has launched a

39

Competition Bureau (Canada), "Competition Bureau's Case Against Canada's Largest Real Estate Board: Hearing
Starts Today," <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03495.html> (last accessed: 3 June
2016).
40
Competition Bureau (Canada), Self-regulated professions: Balancing competition and regulation (Ottawa:
Competition Bureau (Canada), 2007) online: Competition Bureau (Canada)
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02523.html> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
41
E.g. Sean Rehaag, "Law Society failing vulnerable refugee claimants (Toronto Star, May 18 2015),"
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2015/05/18/law-society-failing-vulnerable-refugee-claimants.html>
(last accessed: 3 June 2016); Kenyon Wallace, Rachel Mendleson and Dale Brazao, "Broken Trust (Toronto Star
Project, 2015)," <http://projects.thestar.com/broken-trust/> (last accessed: 3 June 2016), but see James Balkwill,
"Self-governance the problem (Letter to the editor of the Toronto Star, Fri., Jan. 16, 2015),"
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/letters_to_the_editors/2015/01/16/self-governance-the-problem.html> (last
accessed: 3 June 2016).
42
Devlin and Morison, "Access To Justice And The Ethics And Politics Of Alternative Business Structures," supra
note 28 at 539.
43
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "Model Code of Professional Conduct," supra note 29.
44
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "National Initiatives," <http://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/> (last accessed:
3 June 2016).
45
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "Council of the Federation," <http://flsc.ca/about-us/council-of-thefederation/> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
46
Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters Family Justice Working Group, Meaningful
Change for Family Justice: Beyond Wise Words (Ottawa: ACAJCFM, 2013) online: ACAJCFM
<http://www.westcoastleaf.org/userfiles/file/FJWG%20report%20Meaningful%20Change%20Consultation%20Jan
%202013.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Law Commission of Ontario, Increasing Access to Family Justice
Through Comprehensive Entry Points and Inclusivity (Toronto: LCO, 2013) online: LCO <http://www.lcocdo.org/family-law-reform-final-report.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Noel Semple and Nicholas Bala,
Reforming the Family Justice System: An Evidence-Based Approach (Report commissioned by the Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts, Ontario Chapter) (Toronto: AFCC Ontario Chapter, 2013) online: SSRN
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“Family Legal Services Review” led by a retired judge.47 As explained below, this could lead to an
expansion of non-lawyers’ spheres of permitted practice. Although the review is co-sponsored by
the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC),48 it is a rare example of a Canadian government body
taking a direct interest in legal services regulation.
Quebec is a different story, slightly removed from pure self-regulation and thus closer to coregulation. The provincial government’s Office des professions du Québec oversees the two legal
self-regulatory bodies along with the other professions.49 However, this relationship appears to a
relatively harmonious one in which the lawyers’ self-regulatory bodies take the lead.

3. Professional Licensing and Occupational (Dis)Unity
How many different legal professions will be licensed within a given jurisdiction? Will
regulation seek to enshrine professional unity? Or will it foster a multiplicity of professions and
professional pathways, and encourage them to compete against each other? Legal services
regulators’ differing policy choices on these issues reflects the dichotomy between the
professionalist-independent and competitive-consumerist modes.
The legal professions in competitive-consumerist UK and Australasia have long been
divided between barristers and solicitors,50 and further professional ramification has occurred in
recent years. Moreover, the doctrine of regulatory competition in these countries encourages the
multiple legal professions to compete against each other for clients, for practitioners, and for
regulatory expansion of their respective spheres of jurisdiction.51

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366934> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Advocates' Society, Family Justice Reform
Project (Toronto: The Advocates’ Society (Ontario), 2014) online: The Advocates’ Society (Ontario)
<http://www.advocates.ca/assets/files/pdf/news/Family_Justice_Reform_Paper-Grassroots_Project_oct6.pdf> (last
accessed: 3 June 2016).
47
Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), Family Legal Services Review Consultation Paper (February 9, 2016)
(Toronto: MAG (Ontario), 2016) online: MAG (Ontario)
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/legal_services_consultation_paper.html> (last accessed: 3
June 2016)
48
LSUC is the legal services regulator for Ontario, Canada’s largest province. Ministry of the Attorney General
(Ontario), "Terms of Reference for Family Legal Services Review," <https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2016/02/termsof-reference-for-family-legal-services-review.html?_ga=1.92337438.201967515.1452098441> (last accessed: 3
June 2016).
49
Légis Québec, "Code des Professions (Quebec), chapitre C-26," <http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fr/ShowDoc/cs/C26> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
50
Roger Kerridge and Gwynn Davis, "Reform of the Legal Profession: An Alternative Way Ahead" (1999) 62
Modern Law Review 807.
51
Stephen, Lawyers, Markets and Regulation, supra note 2 at Chapter 7; Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the
Crossroads, supra note 4 at 79.
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Canada’s legal profession, by contrast, is much more unified and the competition between
different occupational groups is much less evident. Regulation in this country has never
distinguished barristers from solicitors or recognized licensed conveyor professions.52 As in the
United States, the overwhelming majority of legal work in Canada is done by lawyers who need
compete only with other lawyers. Licensed Canadian lawyers can offer any and all legal services.
Unlike in the medical field, regulators do not require specialist credentials (although some clients
do).
The training and licensing process is fairly consistent across the country. In every province
and territory, lawyers must obtain an undergraduate post-secondary education (typically a four-year
bachelor-level degree although two or three years suffice in some cases). Candidates must then
graduate from a three-year law school program. At this point in prospective lawyers’ education, the
law societies take over from the universities. Candidates must pass a bar exam and, in some
provinces, attend professional training classes that are meant to be more practical than law school.
One licensing requirement that distinguishes the Canadian jurisdictions from the American
states is “articling,” an apprenticeship lasting between 6 and 10 months. Candidates are responsible
for finding their own articling positions, which can be very challenging.53 Given that the job market
for licensed lawyers is reasonably strong,54 some argue that the articling requirement is an artificial
regulatory bottleneck separating would-be lawyers from the market.55 Bar exam passage rates are
generally much higher in Canada than they are south of the border, which may provide some
52

Devlin and Morison, "Access To Justice And The Ethics And Politics Of Alternative Business Structures," supra
note 28 at 538; Adam M. Dodek et al., Canadian legal practice : a guide for the 21st century (Markham, Ont.:
LexisNexis Canada, 2009).
53
Jordan Furlong and Canadian Bar Association, Do Law Differently: Futures for Young Lawyers
2016)https://www.cba.org/getattachment/Publications-Resources/Resources/Futures/DO-LAW-DIFFERENTLYFUTURES-FOR-YOUNG-LAWYERS/NewLawforNewLawyersEng.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016)at 13;
Kendyl Sebesta, "Articling crisis gets worse: Report shows three-percentage-point increase in applicants without
jobs" Law Times (Monday, May 07, 2012) http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201205079078/HeadlineNews/Articling-crisis-gets-worse>.
54
Glenn Kauth, "New report notes 94% employment rate for law graduates (Legal Feeds, 24 February 2014),"
<http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/1952/new-report-notes-94-per-cent-employment-rate-for-lawgraduates.html> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
55
Avner Levin and Asher Alkoby, "Barriers to the Profession: Inaction in Ontario, Canada and its Consequences"
(2013) 3 Oñati Socio-legal Series 580. In response to concerns about articling student unemployment, the Law
Society of Upper Canada launched a “Pathways Pilot Project” which, among other things, gives candidates the
option of enrolling in a Law Practice Program in lieu of articling (Law Society of Upper Canada Articling Task
Force, Pathways To The Profession: A Roadmap For The Reform Of Lawyer Licensing In Ontario (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2012) online: LSUC Gazette <http://www.lawsocietygazette.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/ArticlingTaskForcefinalreport.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016);Law Society of Upper
Canada, "Pathways Pilot Project," <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/Pathways/> (last accessed: 3 June 2016)).
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consolation for candidates who envy their American counterparts’ freedom from the apprenticeship
requirement.
Canadian lawyers enjoy a relatively hegemonic position in the market. A handful of
competing legal professions do exist, but the relatively minor nature of these exceptions helps them
prove the general rule of occupational unity. The two ancient exceptions are the notarial professions
of British Columbia (B.C.) and Quebec. In B.C., there are only a few hundred notaries. It appears
likely that the Law Society of B.C. (the self-regulatory body for the main professional group in that
province) will soon obtain regulatory control over the notaries, thereby bringing British Columbia
even closer to the principle of occupational unity.56 The Chambre des notaires du Québec is larger
(almost 4000 notaries), and it is fully independent of Quebec’s lawyers.57 The Code Civil gives
Quebec notaires their own scope of practice which includes some litigation as well as transactional
work. This plurality of legal professions again places Quebec’s legal services regulatory regime
closer to the competitive-consumerist mode of the UK and Australia.

a) Recent Canadian Trends in Professional Licensing
In recent years, two more legal para-professions have come into existence in Canada.
Immigration Consultants are federally licensed non-lawyers who can provide representation and
advice in immigration and refugee matters.58 Ontario paralegals have been licensed and regulated
by the Law Society of Upper Canada since 2007.59 There is a small set of legal tasks that paralegals
are permitted to perform independently in competition with lawyers.60 Ontario’s Family Legal

56

Society of Notaries of British Columbia and Law Society of British Columbia, "Memorandum of Understanding
and Appendices," <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/home/blog/MOU-Notaries.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
57
Chambre Des Notaires Du Québec, Rapport Annuel 2014-2015 (Quebec: CNQ, 2015) online: CNQ
<http://www.cnq.org/DATA/TEXTEDOC/2014-2015.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016); Fiona M. Kay, "Intraprofessional Competition and Earnings Inequalities across a Professional Chasm: The Case of the Québec Legal
Profession" (2009) 43 Law & Society Review 901.
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Services Review (mentioned above) may or may not propose expansion of the paralegal scope of
practice into some family law matters.61
Still, a commitment to professional unity that is strong by international standards
characterizes Canadian legal services regulation. With the exception of Quebec’s notaires,
Canada’s legal para-professions are generally (i) small (ii), constrained to narrow scopes of
independent practice, and (iii) controlled by law societies, which are in turn controlled by lawyers.62
Outside of their narrow bands of permitted work, non-lawyers who offer legal services continue to
be prosecuted for unauthorized practice of law, whether or not their work has been the subject of
client complaints.63 For better or worse, Canada like the U.S.A. seems unlikely to embrace the
increasing competition between legal professions that is now found elsewhere in the common law
world.

4. Insulating Rules and Alternative Business Structures
To what extent should regulators insulate law firms from the influence of non-lawyers?
Traditionally, the prospect of non-lawyer investors, managers or partners in law firms has been
considered a threat to lawyer professionalism and independence.64 The United States continues to
insulate its law firms from non-lawyers, pursuant to traditional professionalist-independent
arguments. Conversely, openness to non-lawyer influence in firms is a distinguishing characteristic
of the competitive-consumerist reform that has transformed legal services regulation in the English-
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speaking world outside of North America.65 Under this influence, alternative business structure
(ABS) solicitor firms with non-lawyer investors are now permitted in countries like Australia and
England & Wales.66
Once again, Canadian legal services regulation is very close to the American position on
insulation and ABS. Most of the provinces do permit firms to incorporate, but only if their shares
are controlled entirely by lawyers.67 “Multi-disciplinary partnerships” between lawyers and others
are forbidden or tightly restricted by the law societies,68 and sharing fees with non-lawyers
(including through the payment of referral fees) is generally prohibited.69 Again, Quebec’s regime
is somewhat closer to the competitive-consumerist model of regulatory openness to non-lawyer
involvement. In that province, non-lawyers are permitted to own share capital in law firms, so long
as the majority of the voting shares are held by lawyers or other regulated professionals.70 In no
part of Canada can an incorporated law firm issue publicly traded shares.

a) Recent Canadian Trends in Insulating Rules
The Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) ABS Working Group reports sparked
reconsideration of these issues in early 2015.71 Several legal academics,72 along with the Canadian

65

Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4.
Semple, Legal Services Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 4 at 65-67.
67
Family members of licensees can in some provinces also hold shares. See Law Society of Alberta, Law Society of
Manitoba and Law Society of Saskatchewan, Innovating Regulation (Edmonton, Winnipeg, Regina: LSM LSA,
LSS, 2015) online: LSS <http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca/publications/innovating-regulation.aspx> (last accessed: 3
June 2016) at 43 and 51.
See also Law Society Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. L.8, s. 4.2, at s. 61.0.1(4);
Legal Profession Act (Alberta), RSA 2000, c. L-8, at s. 131(3)(e);
The Legal Profession Act (Manitoba), SM 2002, c. 44, at s. 32(1);
Legal Profession Act (Nova Scotia), SNS 2004, c. 28, as amended by SNS 2010, c. 56, at s. 21(1);
Law Society Act 1999 (Newfoundland & Labrador), SNL 1999, c. L-9.1, at s. 63.4(1).
68
Richard Devlin and Albert Cheng, "Re-calibrating, re-visioning and re-thinking self-regulation in Canada" (2010)
17 International Journal of the Legal Profession 233; Law Society of Alberta, Law Society of Manitoba and Law
Society of Saskatchewan, "Innovating Regulation," supra note 67 at 49.
69
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "Model Code of Professional Conduct," supra note 29 at Rule 3.67 and
corresponding provisions in the provincial Law Societies’ codes.
70
Legis Quebec, "Règlement sur l’exercice de la profession d’avocat en société et en multidisciplinarité (chapitre B1, r. 9),"
<http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=%2F%2FB_1%2FB1
R9.htm> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
71
Law Society of Upper Canada Professional Regulation Committee, Report to Convocation, January 29, 2015
(Toronto: LSUC, 2015) online: LSUC
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/Convocation_Decisions/2015/conv
ocation-january-2015-professional-regulation.pdf> (last accessed: 3 June 2016).
For a comprehensive account of the Canadian debate regarding alternative business structures, see Devlin and
Morison, "Access To Justice And The Ethics And Politics Of Alternative Business Structures," supra note 28.

66

13
Bar Association’s Futures Initiative,73 argued that our regulators should roll back insulating rules.74
The author’s personal view is that insulating anti-ABS rules contribute to the deplorable state of
access to justice in Canada, because they artificially suppress the size of personal plight law firms
and prevent potentially access-enhancing collaborations with non-lawyers.75
However, as of mid-2016, the professionalist-independent dedication to insulating law firms
seems likely to survive the current debate.76 Canada’s legal services regulators seem unlikely to
permit full-scale ABS on the English/Australian model.77 Defenders of insulating rules have argued
that profit-obsessed outsiders would undermine lawyers’ ethics and loyalty to their clients,78 and
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that ABS would not improve access to justice.79 The majority of the 40 submissions to the Law
Society’s ABS consultation opposed allowing majority non-lawyer ownership.80 Opposition was
led by the Ontario Trial Lawyers’ Association (OTLA).81 The OTLA represents plaintiff-side
personal injury lawyers, the segment of the bar which has been most dramatically disrupted by new
ABS competitors in England and Australia.
The LSUC Working Group removed majority non-lawyer ownership from the list of options
being considered in September 2015.82 However, “more limited non-licensee ownership models for
traditional law firms” remain on the table.83 This might include the current Quebec model.84 Other
common law provinces have thus far adopted a “wait and see” approach. Once again, the reform
pressure from outside the profession, which sparked competitive-consumerist reform in Northern
Europe and Australasia, is conspicuous in its absence from the Canadian debate on insulating
regulation.

5. Regulatory Focus: Entity Regulation and Proactivity
A fourth set of policy decisions has also divided professionalist-independent legal services
regulators from competitive-consumerist ones. These are issues of regulatory focus. Regulatory
focus is, first, a matter of who is to be regulated: only individual practitioners, or also the law firms
in which they work? Second, regulatory focus involves the question of when regulation will be
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applied: in response to problems, or also to prevent problems and encourage improvements in
practice?85

a) Recent Canadian Trends: Entity Regulation
Traditionally regulation (including licensing, codes of conduct, and discipline) has been
aimed at individual practitioners. Law firms large and small were functionally invisible to
regulation, and not mentioned in the codes. This remains the case, more or less, in the United
States.86 Individual-focused regulation is therefore one of the four pillars of the professionalistindependent mode of legal services regulation that has proven surprisingly resilient in the United
States.87 Northern European and Australasian regulators, however, have moved in a very different
direction in recent years. Entity regulation of law firms is now found in many of these
jurisdictions,88 deployed as a way to entrench “ethical infrastructure” and thereby protect consumer
interests.89
Canada’s position is, for now, quite close to that of our southern neighbours. A few of the
law societies do have authority to regulate firms and other entities in which lawyers practice. So far
only Nova Scotia has formally embraced entity regulation,90 and drafted systems and tools to
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effectuate it.91 Adam Dodek’s 2011 observation that "as a general matter, law societies regulate
individual lawyers,” and not firms, remains accurate today.92
That being said, the odds of a Canadian departure from the professionalist-independent
mode are higher in this policy space than they are in the other three reviewed above. Entity
regulation, like ABS, is a “hot topic” (at least by the temperate standards of Canada’s legal services
regulation discourse). In different parts of the country, discussion papers have been published and
submissions are being sought.93 Amy Salyzyn argues that Canadian regulators should take an active
interest in firms’ ethical infrastructures, and she identifies entity regulation as one way (although not
the only way) to do so.94 Manitoba has recently amended its statutes to authorize entity regulation
by the Law Society of Manitoba. 95 One ambitious idea, raised in a joint discussion paper by the
three prairie law societies, is to apply entity regulation to in-house legal departments within
corporations and perhaps even to government ministries, along with “pure” private sector law
firms.96
Compared to the ABS proposals, Canadian regulators’ entity regulation trial balloons have
provoked less resistance from the bar. However some do share the American legal ethicists’ concern
about undermining individual ethical responsibility.97 Others worry that entity regulation will
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constitute an superfluous extra layer of obligations on small firm and solo practitioners,98 increasing
their cost of doing business and eventually, perhaps, their service prices.99
It seems plausible that there will be some modest move towards entity regulation. Law
societies might well obtain the necessary powers through amendments to their respective
empowering statutes, but then use those powers only sparingly. Increased reliance on voluntary
efforts to enhance ethical infrastructure at the firm level – such as the Canadian Bar Association’s
“Ethical Practices Self Evaluation Tool,” is another likely development.100

b) Recent Canadian Trends: Proactive Regulation
As noted above, questions of regulatory focus are not just about whether or not firms are to
be regulated, but also about when regulation is to be applied. Entity regulation could in principle be
applied in the traditional “reactive” manner, imposing punishment on a firm or requiring remedial
action from a firm only if a complaint or audit reveals a problem.101 However, regulators are
increasingly enthusiastic about “proactive” or “compliance-based” approaches that are applied to all
firms regardless of whether there is any sign of problems.102
While this topic has generated significant interest of late, proactivity in legal services
regulation is by no means unprecedented. What Michael Trebilcock terms “input” legal services
regulation has a long history, most familiarly in licensing and educational requirements for new
lawyers.103 If entity regulation is embraced by Canadian legal services regulators, it seems likely
that it will be primarily proactive rather than reactive in nature.

6. Conclusion
a) Canada’s Place in the Common Law World
Canadians are like most residents of small countries with large neighbours and the
insecurities about national identity that tend to result. We like to accentuate (and defend) our clear-
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cut differences from the United States. However, our general approach to legal services regulation
cannot realistically be counted among these points of dramatic distinction. If the legal services
regulatory regimes of the common law world are indeed bifurcated into competitive-consumerist
jurisdictions on one hand and professionalist-independent ones on the other, then Canada remains in
the latter camp along with the American states.
Self-regulation remains a consensus principle across the country.104 By international
standards, the unified profession of “lawyer” in Canada enjoys unity and hegemony, with relatively
little competition among multiple legal professions.105 The regulatory policy of insulating law firms
from non-lawyer investors and managers seems set to resist the push for regulatory openness and
alternative business structures.106 When it comes to entity regulation, although our regulators are
somewhat more ready to take modest steps toward the competitive-consumerist mode, again no
major revolution is likely.107
Why has Canada resisted competitive-consumerist reform of legal services regulation? The
question is intriguing because, in many other policy domains, our country remains more similar to
its Commonwealth brethren than it is to the revolutionary Republic. The proximate cause of the
dichotomy between professionalist-independent and competitive-consumerist modes seems to have
been the presence of reform pressure from governments, competition authorities, and consumer
groups in Northern Europe and Australasia, and the absence thereof in North America. This,
however, begs the question of why that reform pressure never rolled onto these shores. Federalism
seems unlikely to explain it, given that (i) Canada’s federal government would have no basis to
prevent legal services regulatory reform by the provinces and (ii) federalism has not impeded
competitive-consumerist reform in Australia.
In previous work, the author has speculated about possible ways to account for the
divergence.108 It could be that more generous legal aid in the UK and Australia led to greater state
interest in reducing legal fees by fostering competition.109 Another possibility is that less generous
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social safety nets in North America increased the perceived need for and tolerance of non-state
market shelters such as traditionally-regulated professions. Finally, it could be that the historic
barrister-solicitor division in the UK and Australia, and the attendant intra-professional squabbles
over regulatory privileges,110 called public attention to issues of professional powers and
competition in a manner that has not transpired here.

b) Professionalist-Independent Regulation, For Better and for Worse
This Chapter’s characterization of Canadian legal services regulation as relatively traditional
is, by and large, not meant as criticism. It is true that there are episodes of regulatory decisionmaking in which self-regulation arguably lets the economic interests of a particular group of
lawyers trump the public interest.111 It is not entirely clear, for example, that the Law Society of
Upper Canada was single-mindedly pursuing the public interest when it brought its professional
indemnity insurer into the title insurance market,112 or when it excluded independent paralegals
from all family law practice.113 However the author’s view is that Canada’s law societies usually
balance their many commitments reasonably, and carry out their mandates effectively and
efficiently.
The professionalist-independent tradition of legal services regulation has several distinct
virtues, to which competitive-consumerist reformers in Northern Europe and Australasia may have
given too short shrift. I have argued that this tradition can and should endure, so long as it is
reinvigorated through an overall dedication to client-centricity and several specific reforms
(including a significant rollback of insulating regulation).114 In several ways, Quebec regulates legal
services in a more competitive-consumerist mode: greater state involvement, greater openness to
non-lawyers, and a greater multiplicity of competing legal professions. La belle province offers a
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distinct approach, and one that in some respects can be a model for the law societies of the other
Canadian provinces.
“Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose” (the more things change, the more they stay the
same) may not be entirely fair as a summary of Canadian legal services regulation at this point in
time. There is a constant stream of minor course corrections, and a willingness to at least talk about
larger changes. However, the professionalist-independent regulatory tradition remains as strong in
this country as it is anywhere in the world. The reform we have seen, and the reform we are likely
to see in the future, is evolutionary in nature rather than revolutionary.
Richard Devlin and Ora Morison described the Canadian ABS debate as “a monologue
within the Canadian legal profession,” in which “neither governments nor consumers nor
corporations have had much to say.”115 This description, it seems, is apt for legal services
regulatory discourse in this country in general. It is very hard to find any Canadian who is not a
lawyer who takes any interest whatsoever in the regulatory issues discussed here. The scrutiny from
competition authorities, legislators, and consumer groups which presaged thoroughgoing
competitive-consumerist reform in Australia and the UK is not evident in Canada at this time. Thus
Canada’s legal profession seems to have the luxury of deciding for itself how and whether to reform
legal services regulation. All Canadians who rely directly or indirectly on legal services and the rule
of law – which is to say all Canadians – should hope that this discretion is used in a publicinterested and perspicacious fashion.
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